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AN EXPLORATION OF THE ACTIVATION OF SYMPATHY IN RELATION 
TO ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND THE POOR 
CHRISTOPHER P. REMILLARD, JR. 
ABSTRACT 
As economic inequality in the United States continues to increase, the ways in 
which Americans cope with and conceptualize the issue itself as well as the 
disadvantaged groups affected by it has become increasingly salient features of their 
political attitudes. While important research has been done, particularly by Bartels 
(2009), showing that Americans share widespread consensus that economic inequality is 
a negative feature of American society and that Americans do not harbor any innate 
antipathy towards the poor, more work needs to be done to understand what activates 
Americans’ sympathy for the poor. This study, building on Burden and Klofstad’s (2005) 
assessment into the effects of cognitive and affective priming, seeks to understand how 
issue and subgroup framing alters political expression. I find that the use of the word 
“feel” in survey questions—as opposed to the word “think”—makes respondents more 
likely to hold poor subgroups less accountable for their economic circumstances. 
However, this differential outcome does not manifest when applied to policy-based 
questions. This indicates that invoking person- or group-based arguments along with 
affective signifiers shows the best promise for activating sympathy for the poor among 
Americans.  
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Introduction 
Since the mid-1970s, economic inequality in the United States has been 
increasing at an alarming pace. Saez (2016) found that the top 0.01% of earners in the 
country (16,500 households) took home 5.1% share of the total U.S. income in 2013. Just 
four decades prior, that same cohort claimed only a 0.8% share. The story of wealth 
inequality in the United States is even more grim. A separate study by Saez and Zucman 
(2015) showed that wealth inequality is rapidly approaching Depression-era levels, with 
the wealthiest 1% of American families controlling over 40% of the nation’s wealth. 
Further, the researchers found that economic inequality is fully stratified, meaning that 
within the wealthiest cohort of Americans, the richest among them are earning and 
consolidating wealth at the highest rates. 
 Concurrently, countless studies have been aimed at measuring how Americans 
react to rising economic inequality. Data from the American National Election Survey 
shows that well over three quarters of Americans recognize that income inequality has 
increased in the past 20 years. In his analysis of the survey data, Bartels (2016) found 
that, among those who correctly recognized that inequality had increased, “fewer than 6% 
said that increasing inequality was a good thing.” Norton and Ariely (2011) published a 
study in which they asked respondents to report both what they thought the current 
distribution of wealth in the United States is as well as the ideal distribution. They found 
that, although Americans vastly underestimate wealth inequality, they still prefer a 
substantially more egalitarian distribution than their estimate. 
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 This research suggests broad consensus among Americans on a factual and 
normative basis: economic inequality is rising and rising inequality is a negative feature 
of the American economy. However, there is a lack of research on the mechanisms that 
underlie how Americans conceptualize economic inequality. Does economic inequality 
inspire a cognitive or affective response among Americans? In other words, do 
Americans respond differently to questions about economic inequality that frame the 
issue as a “thinking” process or a “feeling” process? Moreover, how does both framing 
and priming affect how respondents report their views on racial subgroups impacted by 
economic inequality in the United States? Hahn et al. (2017), on behalf of the Urban 
Institute found that “a larger African American share of a state’s total population is also 
associated with less generous, more restrictive TANF policies,” indicating that race is a 
potentially salient cleavage in how Americans construct and express their views towards 
the poor and the redistributive social programs that benefit them. Built on the framework 
of Burden and Klofstad’s (2005) research into the conceptual mechanisms underlying 
party identification, the research design presented here attempts to address these 
questions through a multi-treatment survey experiment. 
 My discussion will proceed in four parts. First, I will situate this project in the 
appropriate literature, contextualizing in greater detail the public response to, as Bartels 
(2016) puts it, “some of the most important issues in contemporary American politics.” 
From there, I will explain the experimental design. In the third section, I will present the 
three hypotheses I have derived from the observable implications of the theory that 
cognitive and affective framing impacts responses to the issue of economic inequality. 
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Finally, I will conclude by presenting the results of the survey experiment and discussing 
the implications of the findings therein. 
Part I: Facts, Feelings, and Bernie Bros 
 On May 26, 2015, standing on the shore of Lake Champlain in Burlington, 
Vermont, Senator Bernie Sanders declared his candidacy for President of the United 
States. In a speech to supporters, he emphasized repeatedly the issue that would define 
his campaign, economic inequality, and declared that “wealth and income inequality is 
the great moral issue of our time, it is the great economic issue of our time, and it is the 
great political issue of our time.” Indeed, Sanders structured his campaign around the 
topic, often drawing criticism from pundits and political opponents alike for his weakness 
on other issues such as foreign policy and defense.  Nevertheless, Sanders was able to 
stage a shockingly formidable primary challenge against the seeming heiress apparent to 
the Democratic Party, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The Vermont Senator 
vastly outperformed expectations in the primary, winning 23 states and territories and 
garnering 43% of the popular vote. It is undeniable that the Senator was able to energize 
a significant portion of the electorate primarily on the basis of a single issue, economic 
inequality, in a way that is unparalleled in recent American politics. 
 While anecdotal, Senator Sanders’ campaign was emblematic of a growing 
frustration with the increasing economic inequality that has become a defining feature of 
the American economy. This frustration is justified. A 2016 report by the Congressional 
Budget Office found that between 1989 and 2013 only the richest 10% of families had 
managed to make substantial gains in holdings of family wealth. In the latter half of this 
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period, Americans also witnessed “two of the biggest tax cuts in American history” in 
2001 and 2003 whose “benefits went disproportionately to the wealthy.” The 2011 
Occupy Wall Street movement demonstrated the prevalence of economic anxiety about 
inequality, and Sanders was able to efficiently channel these feelings into a viable 
political platform. 
 The central question here is regarding how these feelings are formulated by 
Americans. Past research has failed to capture the conceptual mechanisms underlying 
Americans’ attitudes towards economic inequality by neglecting to consider how framing 
can alter responses to survey questions on the matter. The most obvious indication of this 
neglect is a lack of consistency among how the issue is posed in major survey 
experiments. The ANES, for example, asked respondents from 2002 to 2012 the 
following question: “Do you think the difference in incomes between rich people and 
poor people in the United States today is larger, smaller, or about the same as it was 20 
years ago?” However, The Harris Poll, another prominent research firm attentive to 
Americans’ political attitudes, asks the question in this way: “Do you tend to feel that the 
rich get richer and the poor get poorer?” Although subtle, the difference in wording is 
significant because each alternative frames the respondent to think about the issue of 
economic inequality in distinct ways. The ANES survey, employing the intransitive verb 
“think,” implicitly suggests that the matter is factual and that respondents must retrieve 
and access information to properly answer the question. Conversely, the Harris version, 
employing the intransitive verb “feel,” encourages the subject to situate their response 
within the wider, emotionally-bound implications of economic inequality: poverty, 
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dependence, homelessness, etc. One would expect that such encouragement, even 
implicitly, would trigger sympathy for the economically disadvantaged in a way that a 
“thinking,” factual analysis may not. Thus, responses may diverge. Of course, one cannot 
simply compare the responses to these two questions to come to an understanding of the 
effects of the divergence in cognitive or affective framing because the questions differ in 
more than just the chosen verb. 
 Burden and Klofstad (2005), in their study, sought to measure the implications of 
cognitive and affective framing on party identification. They reasoned that “religious 
identities, like partisan ones, are...psychological attachments to groups rather than 
behaviors” and “if party identification is something that is felt rather than thought, then 
the questions used to measure the concept ought to emphasize affect rather than 
cognition.” The researchers randomly assigned respondents to two treatments, one that 
asked whether respondents thought of themselves as Republican, Democrat, or 
Independent and another that asked to which party identification respondents “usually 
feel” they belong. Burden and Klofstad (2005) also measured response time, 
hypothesizing that “respondents will take even longer to report their party affiliations 
when affect is emphasized.” The researchers found statistically significant differences in 
how respondents identified, noting that “respondents are substantially more Republican 
in their identifications when affect rather than cognition is primed.” Further, in line with 
their expectations, they found that response times were longer to a statistically significant 
degree when the question the question was asked effectively rather than cognitively. 
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 Why might we expect to observe similar findings on a separate issue altogether? 
Bartels’ (2016) research suggests feelings may play a much more significant role in 
conceptualizing economic inequality than do thoughts or facts. In an analysis of 
respondents’ ability to both recognize growing inequality as well as their feelings of 
regret about that fact, Bartels found that conservative respondents with greater political 
knowledge (assessed on the basis of a separate short quiz), were substantially less likely 
than more politically ignorant conservatives to recognize and regret growing economic 
inequality. This suggests that partisan loyalty and ideological predisposition may ossify 
views on economic inequality in a way that significantly disrupts the pathway between 
cognitive recollection and information-informed response. Perhaps feelings—whether 
partisan, sympathetic, or otherwise—play a much more significant role in guiding 
American responses to even factual questions about economic inequality. That is 
precisely the issue at stake in this experiment, and, with an understanding of how this 
project fits in the context of the existing research on economic inequality and conceptual 
mechanization, I will now turn to how I intend to carry it out. 
Part II: The Design 
 The experimental design proposed here largely falls in line with that of Burden 
and Klofstad (2005), with slight adjustments made to facilitate analyzing a broader array 
of information. I began with a representative sample of 957 Americans who were 
randomly assigned to four different treatment surveys that I will describe in greater detail 
below. The surveys will be conducted through the online survey platform Qualtrics. 
There is a surprising dearth of research into the effects of engaging with a sample derived 
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from Qualtrics. Most of the literature regarding online experimental survey design is 
preoccupied with Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a similar platform to Qualtrics in that 
respondents are evaluated for sample representativeness and then compensated for the 
time they spend completing the experiment. Usage of MTurk has faced criticism from 
experts in survey design and political science for its propensity to attract non-
representative samples that skew white, male, young, and unemployed. Further, 
respondents on for-pay survey applications like MTurk and Qualtrics may be subject to 
incentives that compete with or contradict incentives to appropriately complete the 
survey (i.e. survey respondents may move through many surveys in a short amount of 
time with less attention to make more money). These concerns are certainly merited, and 
it will be crucial to the external validity of the findings to account for these factors when 
analyzing the results.  
In the context of research into HIV transmission among gay and bisexual men, 
Beymer et al. (2018) “suggest caution when using these methods for behavioral research” 
but advocate for Qualtrics’ confidentiality, as well as the speed and cost-effectiveness of 
generating a sample. As I will discuss in the subsequent section, the demographic 
representativeness of the sample used here is largely not concerning (see Table 2). From 
a more theoretical perspective, Lowry et al. (2016) advocate for new online methods of 
convenient sample generation, arguing that “no ‘proven’ method without inherent flaws 
exists, and…research would benefit from a clearer articulation and understanding of the 
range of methods and data sources available, along with their limitations and 
advantages.” Thus, the lesson here is to proceed with caution. 
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 Respondents across all four treatment groups were asked to answer six 
experimental questions in addition to the demographic questions considered above. 
Figure 1 illustrates the four treatments that were administered to the respondents. Table 1 
illustrates the list of questions respondents were asked. The four treatments are 
categorized across two dimensions. The first dimension randomizes whether respondents 
will be asked the cognitive iteration (including the intransitive verb “think”) or affective 
iteration (including the intransitive verb “feel”) of each question. Other than the 
intransitive verb, the questions will be worded in exactly the same way across all four 
treatments. The second dimension arose during construction of the survey out of a 
dilemma in assessing respondents’ attitudes towards economically disadvantaged racial 
subgroups affected. Because I am interested in assessing not just how Americans 
conceptualize inequality but also attitudes towards particular subgroups, I have chosen to 
ask about two subgroups in particular: poor black Americans and poor white Americans. 
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The goal here is to distinguish how Americans feel about particular groups of 
disadvantaged Americans, especially in relation to other disadvantaged groups. 
However, a problem emerges from the inclusion of these two questions in the 
survey. Whichever question is asked first will likely prime the respondent answer the 
subsequent question in a certain way. Biases resulting from a social desirability effect 
have been well-documented. Researchers (Schuman et al. 1971, Anderson et al. 1988, 
Krysan et al. 2003) have found, while there are certainly substantial biases that result 
from an interviewer’s race during in-person surveys, social desirability bias, among all 
racial groups, manifests in virtual survey designs as well. Thus, a survey respondent that 
is asked a question about attitudes towards poor white Americans first may feel pressure 
to adopt a socially desirable position on a subsequent question regarding poor black 
Americans, correcting for their potentially less tolerant feelings towards African 
Americans. Conversely, a respondent who receives a question about poor black 
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Americans first and displays unfavorable views, may feel pressure to lower their reported 
tolerance for poor white Americans in the subsequent question to achieve the same level 
of social desirability, even if respondents are not publicly held accountable for their 
responses.  
There is no perfect way to account for this bias and elicit answers that accurately 
reflect the true feelings of respondents. Indeed, that has been the evergreen struggle of 
political scientists studying racial attitudes. However, one can randomize the order of the 
questions to demonstrate the diverging pattern of responses that results depending on 
which question is asked first. This approach constitutes the second dimension of 
randomization in the survey experiment, resulting in four total treatments. Respondents 
assigned to Treatments 1 and 2 will receive the poor white Americans question first, and 
respondents assigned to Treatments 3 and 4 will receive that question after a 
corresponding one on poor black Americans. It is crucial to note here that these questions 
are valuable not in that they necessarily measure accurate attitudes towards poor black 
and white Americans but that they provide a randomized experiment that captures the 
exact effect of priming on racial attitudes in the context of questions on economic 
inequality. In other words, I do not expect or propose to make causal inferences about the 
attitudes of Americans on economically disadvantaged racial subgroups, but I do expect 
to make causal inferences about the effect of question ordering on reporting those 
attitudes. The distinction is essential. 
Allow me to briefly explain and justify the chosen scales on each question 
reported in Figure 2. For questions 1, 5, and 6, there were seven available options. 
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Question 1 allowed respondents to choose from “greatly increased,” “moderately 
increased,” “slightly increased,” “remained the same,” “slightly decreased,” “moderately 
decreased,” and “greatly decreased.” Questions 5 and 6 allowed respondents to choose 
from “much more,” “somewhat more,” “slightly more,” “should not change,” “slightly 
less,” “somewhat less,” and “much less.” The decision to offer a seven-point scale falls in 
line with the recommendations outlined by Pasek and Krosnick (2010) in their meta-
analysis of experimental survey design methods. They argue that “ratings tend to be more 
reliable and valid when...seven points [are offered] for bipolar dimensions.” Conversely, 
in questions 2, 3, and 4, four responses are offered. For question 2, respondents may 
choose from “a huge problem,” “a medium problem,” “a small problem,” and “not a 
problem at all.” For questions 3 and 4, respondents may choose from “completely 
responsible,” “somewhat responsible,” “a little responsible,” and “not responsible at all.” 
This construction diverges from Pasek and Krosnick’s recommendation to offer five 
points on unipolar dimensions because I am not inclined to include, in an experimental 
survey designed to measure the effect of activating cognitive, “thought” mechanisms, a 
“haven’t thought about it” or “don’t know” option. As a result, I limit the list of potential 
responses to four. 
Outside of Pasek and Krosnick’s recommendations, offering multiple responses to 
each of the questions in the survey is also critical to the method of data analysis used 
here. I employed difference in means tests to analyze the results across treatments, 
utilizing two-tailed t-tests to assess statistical significance. Each of the responses were 
coded with a number—either one through seven or one through four—and the tested 
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mean will be the calculation of the aggregate of coded responses to the survey questions. 
While, in the subsequent section, I offer directional hypotheses, I have chosen a two-
tailed test in order to capture the potential for my hypotheses to be directionally 
inaccurate. Due to the high number of proposed observations, I have set α at the 
conventional 0.05, meaning that only p-values below 0.05 will be treated as statistically 
significant. With an overview of the experimental design complete, I will now present my 
three hypotheses before moving on to present the findings. 
Part III: The Hypotheses and Implications 
 I have deduced three central hypotheses from the experimental design described 
above. The hypotheses I have formulated consider the results that Burden and Klofstad 
observed in their 2005 study and, where appropriate, extrapolate their findings to the 
context of economic inequality addressed here. The first is as follows: 
H₁: Respondents will, on average, show greater sympathy for the economically 
disadvantaged when the questions are framed affectively rather than cognitively. 
The observable implications of H₁ ought to be borne out in four of the survey questions. I 
expect that, if affective question framing does in fact inspire greater reliance on 
sympathetic motives to responding than informational motives, affectively framed 
respondents should call on the government to do more to combat inequality and provide 
healthcare to the disadvantaged. And finally, affectively primed respondents, with 
activated sympathetic mechanisms, should blame both economically disadvantaged 
subgroups less for their economic fate. 
 The second hypothesis presented here deals directly with the second dimension of 
randomization in the experimental survey (which racial subgroup question is asked first). 
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H2: Respondents will, on average, hold poor black Americans more accountable 
for their economic fate when the question is asked before a corresponding 
question about poor white Americans. 
Research has shown that Americans, especially white Americans, view black people as 
lazier and are more willing to classify poor black Americans as “undeserving” (DeSante 
2013). And while there is significant debate amongst the literature as to whether this is 
due to “principled conservatism” (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) or the emergence of a 
post-Jim Crow “new racism” (Sears et al. 2000), this stereotype still serves as a 
functional heuristic for how Americans view the intersection of poverty and race. Thus, 
we expect that respondents will attribute more culpability to poor black Americans when 
considering them prior to any other racial group comparison. The underlying assumption 
here is that respondents will be more susceptible to consistency bias than social 
desirability bias, although certainly both may be at play. The construction of this 
treatment dimension should provide us insight into the mechanics of assigning blame 
regardless. 
 Finally, the third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: Respondents will correctly answer factual questions at higher rates when the 
questions are framed cognitively rather than affectively. 
This hypothesis is concerned with responses to the first two questions of the survey, both 
factual in nature. Question one has already been addressed extensively above. Economic 
inequality, in both income and wealth, has rapidly increased in the past half century to 
near Depression-era levels. I expect that, since this question requires an information-
based, factual approach to evaluation, respondents will answer the question correctly at a 
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higher rate when the question has primed them to access factual information, or 
“thinking” pathways. 
Question two, too, is a factual question. Despite conservative politicians’ 
insistence otherwise, intentional fraud of means-tested welfare programs, like TANF and 
food stamps, has been estimated to be between 1 and 4% of the total cost of the program, 
most of which comes from bureaucratic mistakes and incompetence, according to a 2013 
piece in The Atlantic by Eric Schnurer. Gustafson (2011) concluded, based on interviews 
with welfare recipients, that “economic need, not greed, fueled cheating.” According to 
Gustafson’s research, the most common form of cheating consisted of failing to report 
marginal income received from under-the-table side jobs taken on to subsist with 
inadequate welfare assistance, not the intentional squandering of benefits on luxury 
items. While her research does show that cheating is occurring, it provides more texture 
to our understanding of the welfare system, as many interviewees described the system as 
a “moral trap” in that they were structurally unable to made ends meet with or without 
only the benefits allocated to them. The conventional conceptualization of welfare 
fraud—a group of entitled beneficiaries squeezing every unnecessary dime out of the 
government—simply is not a widespread problem in the United States. Further, it is 
unclear that investing in monitoring programs to combat intentional fraud—those 
deliberately misleading the government to receive benefits, not mistakes made by 
providers—would actually make up the cost of the fraud in the first place. Thus, on the 
basis of facts and research, to the extent that respondents are familiar with such literature, 
we expect respondents primed to access information-based pathways to responding will 
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be more likely to report that welfare fraud, in the fashion that it is defined in the survey 
question, is not a widespread issue. 
 These three hypotheses, if borne out by the data generated from the experiment, 
would show, not only that framing has a significant impact on attitudes towards economic 
inequality, but that affectively framed questions generate greater sympathy for the 
economically disadvantaged. Such a finding may serve to explain why, despite evidence 
that Americans share widespread consensus on the fact that economic inequality is a 
problem, there has not been a broad, concerted effort to engage in changing it at the elite 
or grassroots level. Perhaps, in the public discourse, the issue of economic inequality is 
far too often framed as a matter of facts and figures, even by prominent activists like 
Bernie Sanders, often lampooned for his regular invocation of “1%” statistics. In reality, 
Americans may conceptualize economic inequality in a much more emotive, sympathetic 
fashion, in line with the terrible consequences that such inequality has on the lives of the 
disadvantaged. This experiment has the potential to connect deficient political response to 
inaccurate issue framing. 
 However, this experiment has another crucial implication for the body of research 
into experimental survey design. How do social desirability bias and priming interact? 
Questions five and six in my survey offer data that directly address this question. A large 
body of research has shown that racial subgroups report interracial attitudes in greatly 
diverging ways depending on how the question is framed, who is asking the question, and 
the experimental environment in which it asked. This experiment builds on that research 
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to illustrate not only the degree to which respondents hold themselves to consistency and 
social desirability, but how cognitive versus affective framing informs racial attitudes. 
 To conclude this section, I turn again to the words of Senator Sanders in his 
concession speech to Hillary Clinton on July 12, 2016: “...something is very wrong when 
the very rich become richer while many others are working longer hours for lower 
wages.” Like Sanders, most Americans recognize this wrong, but little is understood as 
far as the mechanisms that have brought them to that conclusion. This experiment aspires 
to fill in that gap in knowledge. Armored with it, activists may construct more convincing 
arguments, politicians may found sturdier platforms, and political scientists may move 
forward with a greater understanding as to why Americans think, or feel, about economic 
inequality with great fervor, but fail to act. 
Part III: Results and Discussion 
 A sample of 957 American was obtained via Qualtrics, a data collection software, 
to conduct this survey. Due to the nature of the Quatrics interface, respondents were 
given the option to exit the survey at any point for any reason. Because of this, only 931 
respondents in the sample answered all six experimental questions, constituting an 
attrition rate of 2.72%. Respondents who withdrew from the experiment before 
answering all six experimental questions were not excluded from the analysis because 
there is no indication that attrition occurred in any systematic way that would bias the 
results. Table 2 illustrates the demographic breakdown of the sample at the beginning and 
the end of the experiment. Column 1 shows the racial, gender, and income compositions 
of the 957 respondents who provided answers to the first question on the survey 
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regarding the direction of change in economic inequality over the last half century. 
Column 2 shows the same data for the 931 respondents who provided answers to the final 
question in the experiment regarding respondents’ opinions on the federal government’s 
responsibility to provide healthcare for the poor. For comparison, column 3 contains data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau on the demographic composition of the United States in 
2016. 
 Table 2 demonstrates that attrition over the course of the experiment did not 
drastically or systematically alter the demographic composition of the sample. Thus, the 
exclusion of data on respondents who withdrew is unnecessary because there are no 
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expected biases as a result of attrition. However, due to the nature of questions 3 and 4 in 
the survey, perhaps excluding respondents who withdrew from the experiment before 
completion is necessary to ensure that the question ordering treatment was fully 
administered. For example, suppose a respondent assigned to Treatment 3 exited the 
survey just after answering the question on poor black Americans but before answering 
the subsequent complementary question about poor white Americans. Including data 
from a partially administered treatment could potentially bias the results. Fortunately, 
however, the exact same number of respondents—947—provided answers to both 
questions about racial subgroups, indicating that there is no data in the sample from 
respondents who withdrew having only partially received the second treatment 
dimension. 
 A second consideration to take into account prior to analyzing responses is the 
demographic discrepancies between the sample and the U.S. population. Column 3 in 
Table 2 indicates that white Americans are only marginally underrepresented in the 
sample. Similarly, the differences between the sample and the population in gender 
composition are negligible. However, the discrepancies between the sample and 
population in income composition are quite large. High income Americans—defined here 
as workers making more than $75,000 a year—are overrepresented in the sample by 
about 17%. Conversely, the proportion of low income Americans—defined here as those 
making $30,000 or less—in the sample is roughly half the proportion of low income 
Americans that make up the U.S. population. While concerning, this discrepancy 
certainly is not surprising, considering the fact that the sample was generated by 
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Qualtrics, a platform on which respondents are recruited to complete surveys on their 
own time in exchange for monetary compensation. Participation in Qualtrics surveys 
presupposes access to the Internet, itself a characteristic that is disproportionately 
concentrated among middle- and high-income earners. Data furnished by the Pew 
Research Center from 2016 shows that 80% of middle-income earners and 94% of high-
income earners enjoy home broadband Internet access. By contrast, only 56% of workers 
earning less than $30,000 a year have access to broadband Internet connection in their 
homes.  
Thus, the underrepresentation of low-income Americans is expected based on the 
method of data collection employed here. However, it is certainly not prohibitive to 
yielding important insights from the dataset, primarily because the goal here is to test the 
effect of affective versus cognitive priming in the expression of attitudes towards the 
poor. If, for example, the goal of this project was to illuminate overall attitudes towards 
the poor, then concerns about the underrepresentation of the poor in the sample would be 
of particular importance. Instead, we are looking for a treatment effect, and, unless there 
is a reason to believe that the poor are more susceptible to the treatment employed here 
than middle- or high-income earners, there is no reason to believe that the presence or 
absence of an effect is driven by the underrepresentation of the poor. Nevertheless, it is 
important to be cognizant of such underrepresentation as the analysis progresses. 
With an account of the relevant demographic considerations of the sample 
complete, allow me to now explore the findings. Table 3 illustrates the results of the first 
affective versus cognitive treatment dimension for survey questions three and four 
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regarding the level of responsibility poor white Americans and poor black Americans 
have for their economic fate. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Several 
important conclusions can be drawn. First, in both questions about racial subgroups, there 
is a statistically significant difference in how respondents reported their feelings on the 
level of economic culpability. Bearing in mind that lower values indicate that respondents 
view the pertinent subgroup as more responsible for its economic position, we witness 
that, when primed with the intransitive verb “feel,” respondents hold the poor less 
accountable. Thus, the data confirms H1, that respondents will, on average, show greater 
sympathy for the economically disadvantaged when the questions are framed affectively 
rather than cognitively. 
Secondly, the treatment effect, while statistically significant, is certainly a modest 
one. This falls in line with the rather modest, but significant, treatment effects that 
Klofstad and Burden reported in their similar study on party identification. In column 1, 
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for example, the gap of 0.191 between the “Think” and “Feel” treatments constitutes just 
4.78% of the range of responses from coded from 1 (“A great deal”) to 4 (“None at all”). 
The corresponding gap of 0.141 in column 2 constitutes just 3.53% of the range. 
However, the narrowness of the treatment effect is not necessarily unanticipated, nor is it 
a cause for concern about the robustness of the finding. After all, the effect that we 
witness in columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 are the result of changing a single word in the 
question. One can imagine that if one word—albeit one designed to trigger a sympathetic 
response—can produce a statistically significant digression in attitudes towards the poor, 
then surely the infinitely more complicated variations in which political elites and the 
media frame poor Americans are bound to have a much more substantial impact on not 
only their attitudes towards these groups but also their preferences on the policies that 
affect them. 
Thirdly, respondents to the survey were generally sympathetic to the poor. In 
response to both black and white subgroups, respondents on average held that these 
groups were responsible for their economic fate somewhere in between “a moderate 
amount” and “a little.” Due to the fact that the Poor whites and Poor blacks variables 
were coded with ordinal responses, it is difficult to assess the level of sympathy based 
simply on the average of responses alone. However, it is telling that, across both racial 
subgroup questions and both treatments, only 16.43% of respondents opined that these 
poor subgroups were “a great deal” responsible for their economic fate. Thus, the vast 
majority of respondents, regardless of the racial group under consideration and the 
presence of affective or cognitive stimulation, were willing to admit that low-income 
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Americans are neither fully nor even predominantly responsible for their economic status. 
This finding is made even more compelling by the fact that, again, low-income 
Americans were underrepresented in the sample. In sum, we observe further support of 
Bartels’ contention that Americans do not harbor an underlying antipathy for the poor 
that is driving support for fiscally conservative social policy. 
The final observation I would like to address about Table 3 is in response to the 
data presented in column 3, which illustrates the differences observed between responses 
to each racial subgroup question within each treatment. For both the “Think” and “Feel” 
treatments we observe negative values in column 3, indicating that respondents in each 
treatment group held poor black Americans ever so slightly more responsible for their 
economic fate than poor white Americans. However, the discrepancies reported in 
column 3 are so marginal—0.069 constitutes just 1.73% of the available range of 
responses, for example—that we can conclude that respondents in both treatment groups 
rated the level of culpability among poor subgroups as essentially the same. Taken at face 
value, these findings advocate for a rather optimistic view of how Americans view the 
intersection of race and economic inequality in the United States. According to the 
findings presented here, Americans are assigning relatively equal levels of culpability to 
poor white Americans as to their poor black counterparts.  
The issue here, however, is that a growing body of research conducted since the 
1960s shows that black Americans face significantly more barriers to economic success 
than white Americans. Black Americans face both explicit and implicit discrimination in 
nearly every aspect of life that is expressly concerned with securing income and building 
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wealth, including gainful employment (Williams 2013), housing (Ross and Turner 2005; 
Einstein et al. 2018), and access to credit (Woods 2012; Kopkin 2018). Moreover, even in 
instances where black Americans are able to overcome these economic obstacles, 
systematic inequalities in domains such as affordable healthcare (Keene et al. 2014) 
entrap black families in positions of dangerous financial vulnerability. Crucially, Hero 
and Levy (2016) have shown that the structural barriers black Americans face in the 
economy are both persistent and expanding, arguing that “race is not only part and parcel 
of the rising tide of inequality but seems an increasingly important component of it.” The 
literature suggests that, compared to white Americans, black Americans are, in fact, less 
responsible for their fate in an economy that structurally disadvantages them. Thus, we 
may alternatively conceptualize the comparable levels of culpability assigned by 
respondents to the two racial groups as a manifestation of false equivalency. With these 
considerations taken into account, the narrative of column 3 is decidedly less optimistic 
about the degree to which society and the economy has become “post-racial” in the 10 
years since the election of the United States’ first black president, Barack Obama. 
Perhaps, however, the results we observe in column 3 of Table 3 are a result of 
biases introduced by the second treatment dimension regarding which of the racial 
subgroup questions was asked to respondents first. Table 4 allows us to parse through the 
effects, if any, that the second treatment dimension had on respondents. In contrast to 
Table 3, the t-test conducted in Table 4 splits responses to the racial subgroups by which 
question the respondent was assigned to answer first. Again, standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. We observe that there were no statistically significant disparities in how 
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respondents rated the level of culpability of each racial subgroup based solely on which 
question with which respondents were primed. In light of this, we must reject H2—that 
respondents will, on average, hold poor black Americans more accountable for their 
economic fate when the question is asked before a corresponding question about poor 
white Americans—in favor of the null hypothesis. 
Here, the critical reader will likely note that in Table 4, the two different treatment 
dimensions are conflated. In other words, Table 4 shows no statistically significant effect 
between all respondents but tells us little about the possible interaction of the first “think-
feel” dimension with the second question ordering dimension. For such readers, I have 
included in the appendix Table A1, a companion to Table 4 that splits the data into each 
of the four treatment groups. In no treatment group does the question ordering have a 
statistically significant impact on how respondents opined on levels of inequality. Thus, 
the “think-feel” dimension is not a plausible explanation for the null results presented in 
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Table 4. This is not to suggest, in the face of a great body of research that suggests 
otherwise (Sigall and Page, 1971; Krysan et al., 1994; Krysan 1998) that priming and 
question ordering have no impact on how respondents behave during survey experiments. 
Instead, Table 4 simply contends that question priming did not have a discernible effect 
here. 
The null results reported in Table 4 serve as an important touchstone for 
analyzing the responses to the rest of the survey. Because we can comfortably conclude 
that question priming and ordering was not a factor influencing responses to questions 3 
and 4 in the survey, we do not have to be concerned about the possible influence this 
priming or ordering had on questions asked after the racial subgroup questions. In other 
words, as we examine effects of the first treatment dimension in Table 5, we can set aside 
the second treatment dimension in good conscience. With that said, Table 5 shows the 
results from the four other survey questions that respondents were asked, divided by the 
treatment group—“Think” or “Feel”—to which respondents were randomly assigned. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all four cases, we observe no statistically 
significant differentiation as a result of cognitive versus affective verb priming. In 
response to the left-hand side of Table 5, we must reject H3, that respondents who are 
cognitively primed will report more accurate answers to fact-based questions. The data 
collected for responses to question 1, about the level of change in inequality (column 1), 
are at least moving in the direction that H3 purports, since lower numbers indicate 
respondents were more likely to say economic inequality had increased when primed 
with the verb “think.” However, column 2 shows that responses are moving in the 
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opposite of the expected direction, since a lower average indicates that respondents were 
negligibly more likely to say welfare fraud was a bigger problem when primed with the 
verb “think.” Regardless, neither divergence across the first treatment dimension 
substantiated statistically significant results, so we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis. 
The right side of Table 5 offers a more intricate narrative. As with the fact-based 
questions, the responses to the opinion-based questions on normative feelings about 
government intervention to either 1) do more to fight inequality generally or 2) provide 
healthcare to the underprivileged specifically, do not result in statistically significant 
divergences based on first treatment dimension assignment. This mandates a 
reconsideration of H2 and certainly complicates our prior acceptance of it. First of all, 
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column 3 indicates that the data is moving in the opposite direction that H2 predicts. The 
average response for the “Think” treatment is higher than the average response for the 
“Feel” treatment, demonstrating that respondents were marginally more likely to support 
government intervention to fight economic inequality with cognitive priming. Column 4 
shows that, on the topic of healthcare, the average response rate was virtually the same 
for both treatments. However, in neither column does the disparity in average responses 
reach statistical significance. Thus, Table 5 appears to imply that affective priming does 
not generate greater sympathy for the economically disadvantaged. How, then, can we 
reconcile Table 5 with Table 3 to reach some conclusion about the viability of H2? 
 I contend that these findings illustrate the complexity of activating human 
sympathy. Perhaps, the reason that we observe statistically significant findings in 
response to racial subgroups question but not to fact- or opinion-based policy questions is 
that questions 3 and 4, unlike questions 1, 2, 5, and 6, urged respondents to think about 
economic inequality in human terms, rather than political terms. Therefore, the mention 
human subgroups activated sympathy for the economically disadvantaged, while the 
“Think” or “Feel” treatments managed the expression of that sympathy. This conclusion 
is supported by prior research done in the field of psychology on the mechanics of human 
sympathy, including findings that Americans are inclined to “avoid negative affect” 
(Koopmann-Holm and Tsai 2014) and that “sympathy and generosity are reference-
dependent” (Small 2010). There is even some support here for Milgram’s infamous 1963 
experiment on sympathy, and the diminishing returns of obedience with greater proximity 
to an affected victim. In particular though, the results presented here endorse 
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Loewenstein and Small’s (2007) model of sympathetic expression, in which humans 
respond to stimuli by engaging either an emotional sympathy pathway or a logical 
deliberative pathway. Several factors, they argue, influence which pathway will be 
triggered, including proximity (both geographic and symbolic) and “identifiable victims.” 
To borrow the researchers’ example, this model explains why “in contrast to the 
sympathetic response to Baby Jessica’s plight”—an 18-month-old that fell down a 22-
foot well in October of 1987—“there is an apparent lack of feelings toward victim 
statistics.” In the context of the findings presented here, questions 3 and 4 presented 
“identifiable victims” in poor white and poor black Americans—even if these questions 
presented abstract groups and not individuals like Baby Jessica—allowing them to 
engage a sympathetic response pathway that was further ossified by affective priming. 
Alternatively, the four other questions presented in the survey provided a framework to 
respondents that was something akin to victim statistics, illustrative of the more 
widespread, abstract consequences of economic inequality. In those instances, the 
deliberative pathway was mobilized, and respondents likely relied upon heuristics other 
than their compassion for the disadvantaged to guide their responses. In short, people 
sympathize with people, not policies.  
 Of course, these findings have incredibly important implications for 
policymakers, activists, and researchers. It is clear that affective priming has an impact on 
expression of attitudes towards the economically disadvantaged when questions are posed 
in human terms rather than policy or political terms. What is less clear, and what requires 
more scrutiny and research, is which of these two factors—affective priming or 
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identifiable victim framing—has a greater impact. Future research must also seek to 
discover if and under which circumstances, policy-based entries to discussions on 
economic inequality can produce sympathetic responses. And finally, future research 
should attempt to replicate the findings presented here while accounting for the notable 
limitations of this study, particularly the underrepresentation of low-income Americans in 
the sample, the challenge of assessing the ordinal gaps in the coded responses of the 
variables, and the viability of the operationalization assumed by the wording of the 
experimental questions. 
Part IV: Conclusion 
 Building on Klofstad and Burden’s (2005) study on the effects of cognitive versus 
affective priming in expressions of political attitudes, this study takes and important step 
forward in the increasingly important project of weaving together the disciplines of 
American politics and social psychology. This is no simple task, and social scientists 
must navigate a constantly shifting palette of contexts, issues, and motivations to arrive at 
some sort of functional framework for understanding and evaluating expression. The 
model presented here is characterized by empirical support for the notion that sympathy 
is more ostensibly activated by affective signifiers when the focus is on groups of 
individuals rather than abstract policy. 
In particular, I find that prior research on the reference dependence and 
ambivalent activation of sympathy can be extrapolated to how Americans conceptualize 
the growing problem of income and wealth inequality in society. Respondents here were 
more susceptible to affective framing when asked questions that pertained to particular 
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groups of people, in this case economically disadvantaged racial subgroups. However, 
policy-based questions did not result in statistically significant, or even directionally 
expected, divergences in attitudinal expression based on cognitive versus affective 
priming. This supports a view of Americans’ attitudes towards the poor, and the economy 
at large, as a limited spectrum of political preference. Framing, whether it be through a 
group-based or policy-based approach and with affective or cognitive signifiers, then 
determines where in the proscribed spectrum a particular political expression will fall. 
Thus, policymakers and elites may find it challenging to achieve success at mobilizing 
public sympathy for policy proposals that do not invoke pertinent groups of people, even 
if those policies are intended to help those people. This isn’t to say that mass support for 
issues is generated out of subgroup appeal, but that reliance on sympathy as an energizing 
influence is intractable in purely policy-oriented discussions. 
Of course, findings such as the ones presented here engage the evergreen debate 
in public opinion regarding just how useful or reliable mass public opinion is as a tool for 
democratic policymakers when it is demonstrably susceptible to a flourishing set of 
factors. Is there such thing as public opinion after all? This project makes no attempt to 
settle that theoretical debate, though it is crucial to acknowledge my implicit subscription 
to it. Suffice it to say that the overall levels of support for the various policies discussed 
here as well as the particular susceptibility to sympathy activation in relation to actual 
groups of individuals conspire to suggest two things. First, Americans occupy a limited 
spectrum of attitudes and beliefs about economic inequality and the poor that includes the 
adoption of meaningful and substantial social programs that can drastically reshape the 
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lives of the poor. Secondly, Americans are certainly vulnerable to being mobilized 
around these social programs if particular attention is paid to how policies are framed by 
elites both theoretically and linguistically. 
As economic inequality in the United States continues to increase, attitudes 
toward the poor and towards the policies that affect them will become an even more 
salient feature of political expression. In order to address a major societal problem, not to 
mention perhaps the defining societal problem in the United States, it is imperative to 
first make sense of how we understand that problem. This study has constituted an 
attempt to do just that, but more work is necessary and, certainly, more progress is 
imminent. 
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Appendix 
 
Part A1: A Reexamination of Both Treatment Dimensions 
 
 
 Table A1 replicates the presentation in Table 4, except the data is split up by both 
the first think-feel experimental dimension as well as the second question-ordering 
dimension. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. This construction allows us to 
decide whether or not the null results reported in Table 4 could plausibly be attributed to 
the influence of the first treatment dimension. Thus, Table A1 shows us that, even among 
those randomly assigned to the same first dimension treatment, the order of the 
experimental racial subgroup questions had no statistically significant impact on 
respondents’ view of the culpability of the poor for their economic circumstances. This 
further supports the prior rejection of H2, that respondents will, on average, hold poor 
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black Americans more accountable for their economic fate when the question is asked 
before a corresponding question about poor white Americans. While the evidence 
presented above illustrates that the first treatment dimension did, in fact, impact 
respondents view on the economic culpability of both poor white and poor black 
Americans, Tables 4 and A1 show that the second dimension did not. Further, the 
interaction of the two dimensions is not a plausible explanation for the data’s opposition 
to much of the research on racial priming, consistency bias, and social desirability bias. 
Rather more pertinent to the analysis presented here, however, Table A1 also illustrates 
that, because question ordering did not demonstrably affect responses, we need not worry 
about its impact on responses to the questions asked in the survey after the two racial 
subgroup questions (see Table 5 and the discussion above). 
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